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Abstract  
The paper investigates the impact of remittance on real effective exchange rate in The 
Gambia. The Fully Modified OLS and Dynamic OLS are used on a monthly data from 
2009M1 to 2019M12. FMOLS and DOLS estimations revealed that remittance has a positive 
significant impact on real effective exchange rate in The Gambia, implying that 1% 
increment in remittance leads to a real appreciation of the Gambian Dalasi (GMD) against the 
major currencies by 1.5%. Likewise, inflation is positively associated with REER, while the 
relationship amid foreign reserves and REER is inconclusive. Contrarily, money supply and 
monetary policy rate were found to have a depreciating impact on REER in both models.  
Keywords: Remittance, Real effective exchange rate, FMOLS, DOLS, The Gambia 
1.0 Introduction  
 
Empirical evidence indicates that foreign capital flows (of which remittances form a 
significant portion in developing countries) foster economic growth, welfare, and poverty 
reduction and have positive impact on certain social indicators. For example, Fajnzylber and 
Lopez (2006) concluded that workers’ remittances accelerate economic growth and reduce 
poverty in the recipient countries. There is also compelling evidence that remittances could 
bolster the fiscal position of governments of recipient countries by expanding the tax base 
(Abdih et al.2009). Governments generally do not tax remittances directly, but they do so 
indirectly through tax on consumption and trade. Since remittances boost consumption and 
imports, they contribute to revenue generation of government.  
 
Despite the benefits, excessive capital inflows have implication for macroeconomic stability, 
especially for small open economies like The Gambia. Theoretically, large capital inflows 
result in acceleration in domestic inflation. This is because higher income due to large 
inflows would increase demand, which would translate to higher prices of non-tradable 
goods. Firms are likely to respond to the rise in demand and prices by increasing output 
which requires more factors of production and a rise in wages. This would fuel a further 
increase in domestic prices and a real exchange rate appreciation. Using data from 1985 – 
2013, Tung et al. (2015) investigated 32 developing countries in the Asian and Pacific region 
and found that remittance inflows caused a significant increase in REER in these countries. 
 
In addition, it has been established empirically that large external inflows to developing 
countries have the tendency to appreciate the domestic currency in real terms and hurt other 
sectors of the economy. This is particularly so if the inflows are not spent on the productive 
sectors. For instance, Acosta et al. (2009) found evidence of real exchange rate appreciation 
in response to remittances in various countries. The rise of the exchange rate and the 
accompanying loss of competitiveness hurt the export sector. In the case of The Gambia, the 
principal sector is the tourism which is the country’s single most important service export and 
a major driver of economic growth.  On the other hand, The Gambian economy may benefit 
from a real appreciation of the domestic currency (dalasi) given that it is largely import-
based, provided the capital that flows in is invested in productive sectors. This is because the 
country would import cheaper to finance production. Although remittance is an important 
feature in the Gambia, its impact on the economy has been rarely investigated. Therefore, we 
deem it necessary to examine the impact of remittance flow on real effective exchange rate 
by employing the Fully Modified and Dynamic OLS.   
The remaining sections of this paper are organized as follows: Section 2 provides a 
background of remittance flows to The Gambia prior and during COVID-19, section 3 
highlighted the theoretical consideration, Section 4 elucidates empirical review, Section 5 the 
methodology employed. Section 6 the data findings, discussions conclusion and 
recommendation. 
 
2.0 Background of Remittance Flows to The Gambia Prior and During COVID-19. 
Money sent by migrant workers abroad to their countries of origin has proven to be a vital 
and reliable source of financing for many developing countries. According to the World 
Bank, private remittance flows to the low-middle income countries (LMICs) reached US$554 
billion, surpassing foreign direct investment and foreign aid to those countries. In some cases, 
private remittance accounts for up to 30 percent of a country’s GDP1. 
 
1 World Bank, Migration and Development Brief 33, October 2020 
The Gambia has a long history of international migration with North America, the United 
Kingdom, Italy, and Spain as the major destination countries. According to the United 
Nations on international migration2, an estimated 9.2 percent of The Gambia’s 2.3 million 
population were living abroad in 2019 in search of better opportunities.  
Private remittance inflows to the country have more than doubled in the past decade. Data 
published by the Central Bank of The Gambia (CBG) shows that remittance inflows through 
the official channel increased from US$174.1 million in 2009 to US$329.8 million in 2019 
(see Chart 2). To put this in context, these figures respectively represent 12 percent and 18 
percent of the country’s GDP in 2009 and 2019. This placed the country among the highest 
recipients of remittances in sub-Saharan Africa when compared to the size of the economy. It 
is important to emphasize that data reported by the authorities only represent inflows that 
pass through the official channel which hugely understates total remittance figures. It is 
evident that a substantial amount of unreported diaspora money flows through the unofficial 
channel that is not captured and difficult to estimate.  
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Evidence suggests that remittances are inherently countercyclical given that they tend to 
increase during periods of crisis to smoothen household consumption, thus providing some 
form of insurance for families against income shocks (Sayeh and Chami 2020). However, the 
COVID-19 pandemic was initially thought to be different given the massive economic 
devastation wrought by the pandemic particularly in richer countries that are the main sources 
of private remittances. At the early stages of the pandemic, the World Bank projected a 
staggering 20% decline in the amount of money sent by migrant workers back home in 2020 
as a direct consequence of the crisis. The Bank predicated this mainly on the decline in wages 
and employment among migrants during the pandemic.  
 
2 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Population Division (2019). International Migrant Stock 2019 
(United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2019). 
 
However, several months into the pandemic, data shows that The Gambia, like many 
developing countries, has registered the most remarkable annual increase in remittance 
inflows. Gambians in the diaspora remitted record US$589.8 million in 2020, about 78.8% 
higher than US$329.8 million in the previous year. The unprecedented increase in official 
statistics is attributable to several factors, including the improvement in data collection by the 
Central Bank3, both in terms of methodology and coverage as more money transfer agents get 
registered. Travel restrictions in response to the public health crisis shut down unofficial 
channels of transfer. Further, the use of technology does not only make it easier and less 
expensive to send and receive money but ensures that data is accurately captured.  
 
Due to the low level of financial inclusion, the money transfer method commonly utilized in 
The Gambia has been the traditional wire transfer through money transfer operators, which is 
often expensive. As a result, the cost of remitting money to The Gambia is high, at 7.0 
percent in first quarter of 2019, according to the World Bank despite being a major recipient 
country compared to the size of the economy. Financial technology, which makes it easier 
and cheaper to send and receive money is still developing with limited products and services. 
However, with the continuous modernization of the payment system infrastructure, increasing 
awareness and the high rate of mobile phone penetration, the use of electronic and digital 
payment methods is growing. Caron (2020) attributed the increased flow of private money to 
developing countries not only to the improvement in data as the informal channel collapsed, 
but also reflects the fact that migrants tend to work in essential sectors and continued to earn 
steady flow of income during the pandemic. In addition, part of the COVID-19 stimulus 
money by governments in advanced economies found itself in developing countries to 
support families, as an investment, or increase in savings. However, another important 
limitation of data from official sources in The Gambia is that it does not show disaggregation 
of the data into usage or purpose.  
 
Remittances is a critical component of the current account of the balance of payments as well 
as a source of tax revenue for governments in developing countries (Abdih et al. 2011). The 
low export base and the high import bill implies that The Gambia persistently runs a deficit in 
 
3 In The Gambia, the Central Bank is the authority that licenses, regulates and supervises banks, foreign exchange bureaus 
and money transfers agents. 
the goods account of the balance of payments. Thus, tourism receipts, as well as official and 
private transfers, are important components of the current account that mitigate the impact of 
the large trade deficit. They are the major sources of foreign exchange liquidity that keeps the 
domestic currency stable against international currencies. The dalasi is among the most stable 
currencies in the sub-Saharan Africa region despite the absence of extractive industries.  
 
This study intends to establish the empirical relationship between private transfers and the 
real exchange rate in The Gambia. It is expected that it will add to existing knowledge on the 
critical role of remittances in the Gambian economy and help inform and guide policy. 
 
3.0 Theoretical considerations 
  
Remittances can potentially affect the real exchange rate through three main channels (see the 
technical annex for a formal discussion). First, remittances may affect the external 
equilibrium of the economy by raising the net foreign asset position of the country. For 
example, the theoretical models of Mussa (1984), Alberola and Lopez (2001) and Aberola et 
al. (2002) imply that the external equilibrium of the economy will be reached when any 
current account imbalance is compensated by a sustainable flow of international capital. In 
turn, the rate of sustainable capital flows will be a function of the stock of foreign assets and 
liabilities of the economy, so that changes to the net foreign asset position of the country will 
lead to changes in the real equilibrium exchange rate.  
 
Given that international remittances are transfers of foreign currency that unlike other types 
of international flows have no obligation associated, remittances will have a direct impact on 
the net financial position of the country vis a vis the rest of the world. Note in this regard that 
the impact of remittances on the stock of net foreign assets differs from the impact of other 
flows such as loans or foreign direct investment flows. In the case of a loan, there is an 
associated liability (the repayment) and therefore the contribution to the net foreign asset 
position of the country is given by the difference between the proceeds and the net present 
value of the repayment obligations. In this regard, loans will positively affect net foreign 
assets to the extent that they have a positive grant component. On the other hand, foreign 
direct investment flows coming into the home country will increase the foreign liabilities and 
therefore, will lead to a decline of the net foreign asset position.  
 
Second, remittances can also affect the internal equilibrium of the economy understood as the 
situation where domestic capital and labor are efficiently utilized. If as discussed above, 
remittances lead to an acceleration in the demand for services, inflation will tend to be higher 
in these sectors which typically are not tradable (and hence somewhat protected from 
competition) leading to a real exchange rate appreciation (the traditional Balassa-Samuelson 
effect).  
 
Similarly, market rigidities may result in productivity differentials between sectors. For 
example, if remittances raise the reservation wage, then excessive wage pressures in the 
tradable sector may lead to employment adjustments to maintain competitiveness, whereas in 
the non-tradable sector employers may admit these pressures because they can pass them 
onto prices. As a result, remittances can also lead to higher productivity growth and lower 
inflation in the tradable sector through their potential impact on the reservation wage. One 
implication of this discussion is that whether remittances are primarily used for household 
consumption or investment purposes will have a direct impact on the way they affect the real 
exchange rate, with remittances that are predominantly consumption oriented having more of 
an appreciating impact on the real exchange rate (Mussa, 1984).  
 
A third possibility for remittances to affect the real exchange rate is through their impact on 
growth (Acosta, et al., 2007), although in this case the impact on the exchange rate is likely to 
be uncertain. On the one hand, an acceleration in the growth rate would lower the stock of net 
foreign assets as a percentage of GDP and hence this would lower the real exchange rate (i.e. 
growth would have the same impact as an increase in the liabilities of the country). If on the 
other hand, the net foreign asset position of the country is negative vis a vis the rest of the 
world, the increase in the rate of growth would lower the liabilities to GDP ratio and hence 
lead to an appreciation. 
 
4.0 Empirical Review  
The relationship between remittance and exchange rate have been widely studied. An earlier 
study of the impact of remittance on REER was conducted by Bourdet and Falck (2003) in 
Cape Verde for the period of 1980 to 2000. They highlighted that an upsurge in remittance 
receipts is associated with an appreciation of the equilibrium REER. Subsequently, Amuedo-
Dorantes and Pozo (2004) utilized a panel data of 13 Latin American and Caribbean nations 
from 1978–1998. They propounded that an increase in remittance inflow results to an 
appreciation of the RER. Similarly, Combes et al. (2012) used “panel co-integration 
technique” to examine the link between remittances and REER, using 42 developing nations. 
they discovered that both public and private inflows lead to the appreciation of the REER. 
Hassan, and Holmes (2013) used the panel co-integrating technique to investigate the long-
run relationship between the remittances and REER for emerging and developing economies. 
The results divulged that an increase in the remittance inflow leads to an appreciation of the 
REER. Keefe (2014) employed a monthly and quarterly data for 15 developing countries. 
The analysis disclosed that remittances stimulate the growth of foreign currency and confirms 
stability for several small developing economies. Nguyen  et al. (2020) also explore whether 
Asian developing countries affected by the Dutch disease, using the “System Generalized 
Methods of Moment (S-GMM) for the linear dynamic panel data (DPD) model “from 32 
countries between 2006 to 2016. They found when remittances per capita rise by 1%, the real 
effective exchange rate (REER) of these countries appreciates by 0.103% which undermines 
these countries’ competitiveness, supporting the existence of Dutch disease. They further, 
highlight that the Dutch disease only appears in nations with low ratio of remittances of GDP 
(less than or equal to 1%). 
 
However, in contrast to the above study, Ozcan (2011) found that remittance leads to 
depreciation in REER. Likewise, Lopez et al. (2007) highlighted that remittances have a 
significant influence on REER. They concluded that with the acceleration of the growth rate, 
the ratio of net foreign assets to GDP reduces and subsequently diminishes the REER. On the 
other hand, increase in growth rate will lower the liabilities of the country and hence 
appreciation in RER. On the internal ground, higher internal demand leads to faster growth of 
the economy, which in turn, leads to appreciation in RER. To sum up, they concluded that 
effect of remittances on RER is uncertain. Similarly, Acosta et al. (2008) deduced similar 
results from their study. Mongardini and Rayner (2009) investigated association between 
remittance and REER in Sub-Saharan African nations, they suggested that there is no long 
run, association between remittance and REER.  
 
5.0 Methodology 
5.1 Data  
In scrutinizing the influence of remittance (GPR) on real effective exchange rate (REER) in 
The Gambia, we used a monthly time series data. The data for REER is obtained from IMF 
International Financial Statistics while the remaining data from “Central Bank of The Gambia 
(CBG) Data Warehouse “covering the period 2009M1-2019M12. The choice of the data is 
based on its availability. REER is used as the dependent variable, GPR is the explanatory 
variables, while foreign reserves, money supply, inflation and monetary policy are the control 
variables.   
LREER=f (LGPR, LFR, LM2, LCPI and MPR)                                                                  (1) 
Where, LREER is the log of real effective exchange rate, LGPR is the log of remittance, LFR 
is the log of foreign reserves, LM2 is log money supply, LCPI is the log of Consumer Price 
Index and MPR is the monetary policy rate. 
Table-1. Variables Representation 
Indicators  Procedure Unit Source  
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Source: Created by authors from the data 
5.2 The Long Run Estimates (FMOLS, DOLS, CCR) 
The “Fully Modified Ordinary Least Square” proposed by Phillips and Bruce (1990) is used 
in this paper. This estimation can resolve endogeneity issues, autocorrelation, omitted 
variable bias and measurement errors present in a model. To test the robustness of the 
FMOLS analysis, the “Dynamic Ordinary Least Square” (DOLS) by Stock and Mark (1993) 
is used. This technique is also able to evade potential endogeneity problems that can 
showcase between the regressors. The dynamic models (FMOLS and DOLS) have the 
proficiency to automatically generate the optimal lags and leads for a model, thereby solving 
the endogeneity and heteroskedasticity as contrast to the ARDL. Our choice of estimation 
method was also dictated by the relatively small sample size.  The FMOLS performs better 
when it comes to small sample size compared to the ARDL, thus, due to the lag section 
process involved in the ARDL various observations are normally lost (Fereidouni et al., 
2014). Likewise, Amarawickrama and Hunt (2007) highlighted that FMOLS makes 
appropriate rectifications to the inference issues that occurs in the EG cointegration method, 
this makes the T-statistic long run coefficient valid. 
LREERt=β0+β1LGPR+β2LFR+β3LM2+β4LCPI+β5MPR+ε𝑖𝑡;                                             (2)                             
Where, LREER is the log of real effective exchange rate, LGPR is the log of remittance, LFR 
is the log of foreign reserves, LM2 is log money supply, LCPI is the log of Consumer Price 
Index and MPR is monetary policy rate. 
 
6.0 Data Presentation 
 
6.1 Descriptive statistic 
Table 1 shows the monthly average growth rate of REER at 4.46%, with maximum and a 
minimum of 4.49% and 4.19% respectively. Remittance recorded monthly growth rate of 
16.67%, with a maximum and minimum of 17.32 and 16.37% respectively. Moreover, the 
growth rate of foreign reserves, money supply, consumer price index and monetary policy 
4.89%, 9.89%, 5.09% and 14.04% respectively. Accordingly, fairly symmetrical data sets 






Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 LREER LREM LFR LM2 LCPI TBILLS 
Mean 4.461951 16.67291 4.890105 9.894716 5.093108 14.04280 
Median 4.496841 16.60812 5.060549 9.867183 5.080222 12.96500 
Maximum 4.641416 17.31734 5.348861 10.60707 5.414161 22.05000 
Minimum 4.195814 16.37348 3.951340 9.340313 4.823663 6.130000 
Std. Dev. 0.103677 0.217584 0.384650 0.331004 0.176526 4.538302 
Skewness -0.574990 0.798217 -1.119779 0.455391 0.202903 0.344806 
Kurtosis 2.351157 2.707582 2.761100 2.279451 1.756662 1.881283 
       
Jarque-Bera 8.571965 12.95105 24.94076 6.631179 8.410294 8.491540 
Probability 0.013760 0.001541 0.000004 0.036313 0.014919 0.014325 
       
Sum 526.5102 1967.403 577.0323 1167.576 600.9867 1657.050 
Sum Sq. Dev. 1.257623 5.539090 17.31082 12.81894 3.645890 2409.754 
       
Observations 118 118 118 118 118 118 
 
 
6.2 Unit Root Test 
 
The long-run estimation makes it a prerequisite for the variables to be stationary at first 
difference and cointegrated. The Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) unit root analysis in Table 
2 divulged that the variables contained unit root at I (0) and non-stationary. However, they 
are stationary at first difference, thus the null hypothesis of non-stationarity is rejected 
considering the ADF t-statistics and P-values which indicated that the variables are 1% 
significance level.  
Table 2: Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) 







LFR -1.539376 0.5102 







ΔLREER -13.68794 0.0000*** 
ΔLREM -6.808641 0.0000*** 










Note: “LREER is log real effective exchange rate, LFR is foreign reserve, LM2 is money supply, LCPI is log of 
consumer price index, and MPR is monetary policy rate, while ***’**’* represent 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level respectively”.  
 
6.3 Johansen Cointegration Test  
 
Table 3 showed the Trace statistics and Max-Eigen values and corresponding critical values 
(5% level) with probability values of Johansen test (1988). The Trace statistic rejects the H0: 
CV=0 at 1% level, while and the Max-Eigen values does not reject it. However, none of the 
tests rejects the second null hypothesis of H0: CV < 1. It implies any deviations in existing 
equilibrium relationship between the variables are temporary and move together in long-run. 
This shows the implication for the presence of long-rung association among the variables. 
 
 
Table 3: Johansen Cointegration Test 
Hypothesis  Trace Statistics Critical Values 5% 
Level 
P Values  
H0 HA 
CV=0 CV≥1 112.5176* 95.75366 0.0021 
CV≤1 CV≥2 76.04127* 69.81889 0.0146 
CV≤2 CV≥3 46.53896 47.85613 0.0661 
CV≤3 CV≥4 25.02250 29.79707 0.1606 
CV≤4 CV≥5 8.189926 15.49471 0.4453 
CV≤5 CV≥6 0.919337 3.841466 0.3376 
Max-Eigen Values 
CV=0 CV≥1 36.47634 40.07757 0.1205 
CV≤1 CV≥2 29.60231 33.87687 0.1524 
CV≤2 CV≥3 21.51646 27.58434 0.2462 
CV≤3 CV≥4 16.83258 21.13162 0.1800 
CV≤4 CV≥5 7.270589 14.26460 0.4576 
CV≤5 CV≥6 0.919337 3.841466 0.3376 
 
Table 4: Method: Fully Modified Least Squares (FMOLS) Dependent Variable: REER  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
LM2 -1.552070 0.417592 -3.716714 0.0003 
LFR 0.009370 0.078721 0.119029 0.0515 
LCPI 2.236594 0.806857 2.771982 0.0065 
LREM 0.519243 0.060657 8.560367 0.0000 
TBILLS -0.019509 0.004411 -4.422630 0.0000 
     
     
R-squared 0.278237     
Adjusted R-squared 0.252460      
S.E. of regression 0.089250      











6.4 Findings and Discussion  
 
FMOLS and DOLS estimations revealed that remittance has a positive significant impact on 
real effective exchange rate in The Gambia, this implies that 1% increment in LREM leads to 
a real appreciation of the Gambian Dalasi (GMD) against the major currencies by 1.5%. This 
relationship can be attributed to the hypothesis of Mussa (1984), Alberola and Lopez (2001) 
and Aberola et al. (2002), who state that remittances could affect the external equilibrium of 
the economy by boosting the “net foreign asset” position of the country.  Implying that the 
external equilibrium of the economy will be achieved when any current account imbalance is 
reimbursed by a sustainable flow of international capital. In turn, the rate of sustainable 
capital flows will be a function of the stock of foreign assets and liabilities of the economy, 
so that fluctuations to the net foreign asset position of the country will lead to changes in the 
real equilibrium exchange rate.  Likewise, inflation is positively associated with REER, this 
confirms the study of Joof and Jallow (2020) who established a positive association between 
inflation and exchange rate in The Gambia.  
  6.5 Conclusion  
The paper investigates the impact of remittance on real effective exchange rate in The 
Gambia. The Fully Modified OLS and Dynamic OLS are used on a monthly data from 
2009M1 to 2019M12. The estimation from the FMOLS revealed that an increase in 
remittance leads to an increase in real effective exchange rate, signifying that as remittance 
increased by 1% the Gambia Dalasi (GMD) will increase (appreciate) by 0.27% in real terms. 
Likewise, CPI has a positive relationship with REER, this confirms the study of Joof and 
Jallow (2020) who established a positive association between inflation and exchange rate in 
The Gambia. Contrarily, money supply and monetary policy rate have a negative impact on 
 
Table 5: Method: Dynamic Least Squares (DOLS) Dependent Variable: LREER  
          
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     LM2 -1.395188 0.515190 -2.708101 0.0080 
LFR -0.038730 0.106932 -0.362193 0.7180 
LCPI 1.841894 1.032377 1.784129 0.0776 
LREM 0.559635 0.080482 6.953577 0.0000 
TBILLS -0.021127 0.005796 -3.645132 0.0004 
          
R-squared 0.534291     
Adjusted R-squared 0.441149      
S.E. of regression 0.076533      
Long-run variance 0.020520    
          
REER, which indicates that an increase in M2 and MPR will decrease the real exchange rate 
of the GMD.  
 
6.6 Recommendation 
Base on the analysis which suggested that remittance flow leads to an appreciation of the 
Gambian Dalasi (GMD) against foreign currency, the following recommendations is made: 
Hence, The Gambia is an import dependent economy, its strength largely dependent on the 
appreciation of the GMD against major currencies- as such policy makers should endeavour 
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